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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
In United States v. Bean (1918), 253 F. 1, the Court states it to be "the
universal rule that every instrumentality lawfully employed by the United
States to execute its constitutional laws and exercise its lawful govern-
mental authority is necessarily exempt from State taxation or interfer-
ence." Quaere, whether the operation of the rule should not depend on the
practical application and effect of the tax as applied and enforced. See
Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston (1873), 18 Wall. 5, 30, 31, 21 L. Ed. 787; West-
ern U. Telegraph Co. v. Atty. Gen. (1887), 125 U. S. 530, 31 L. Ed. 790, 8
S. Ct. 961; Wagner v. Covington (1919), 251 U. S. 95, 64 L. Ed. 157, 40 S.
Ct. 93; Shaffer v. Carter (1919), 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. Ed. 157, 40 S. Ct. 93;
Metcalf v. Mitchell (1925), 269 U. S. 514, 70 L. Ed. 384, 46 S. Ct. 172.
These cases take into consideration the effect of the tax on efficiency in per-
forming the Federal function. Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds, in dissenting opinions in the principal case, hold that the question
of interference with the Government is one of reasonableness and degree,
and that the Federal Constitution must receive a practical construction.
But from most of the authorities it appears that the Supreme Court has
looked only to the subject matter on which the state tax fell. "The prin-
ciple of McCullough v. Maryland has never since been departed from, and
has often been reasserted and applied." Farmers Bank v. Minnesota
(1918), 282 U. S. 516, 58 L. Ed. 706, 34 S. Ct. 354, citing Osborn v. U. S.
Bank (1824), 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204; Home Savings Bank v. Des
Moines (1906), 205 U. S. 503, 51 L. Ed. 901, 27 S. Ct. 571; Grether v.
Wright (1896), 75 F. 742, 753. Thus, United States securities may not be
taxed. Weston v. Charleston, supra. A State cannot tax the franchise of
a transcontinental railroad company chartered by Congress, Calif. v. Cen-
tral Pac. R. R. (1887), 127 U. S. 1, 32 L. Ed. 150, 8 S. Ct. 1073; nor lands
in possession of an Indian tribe, New York Indians (1866), 5 Wall. 761, 18
L. Ed. 708; Choate v. Trapp (1911), 224 U. S. 665, 56 L. Ed. 941, 32 S. Ct.
565; nor the income derived from such lands by a lessee, Gillespie v. Okla-
hosma, supra. Power of the State to legislate in other directions is similar-
ly limited. Thus a Soldiers' Home maintained by the Government is not
subject to state food laws. In re Thomas (1897), 82 F. 304. The prin-
cipal case apparently has extended to an unreasonable degree the doctrine
that a State cannot tax an instrumentality of the Federal Government.
But judging from the later case of Long v. Rockwood (1928), 72 L. Ed. 537,
48 S. Ct. 463, which held that a state cannot, under the provisions of the
Federal Constitution, tax royalties for the use of patents, the tendency is in
favor of a still broader interpretation of this doctrine. However, it is im-
portant to note that the decision in that case was also rendered by a divided
court of five to four. J. J. C., '30.
CoRPoRATIoNs-PowER OF FOREIGN JURISDICTION TO TRANSFER TITLE
TO STOCK CERTIFICATEs.-Certificates of shares in a New Jersey corporation,
transferable in blank and so endorsed, owned by Pilger, a citizen and resi-
dent of Germany, were seized in London during the war by the Public Trus-
tee (custodian of enemy property). In accordance with the laws of Eng-
land, an order was issued vesting title in the Public Trustee. Pilger seeks
to compel the corporation, in an action brought at its domicil, to transfer
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on its books and certify to him the shares of stock so seized. Held, that the
seizure of the certificates in England divested Pilger of title to the shares.
Pilger v. United States Steel Corporation (N. J. Ch., 1928), 141 A. 737.
The principal case is in accord with a recent Supreme Court decision in
a case involving similar facts. Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft V. U. S.
Steel Corp. (1924), 267 U. S. 22, 69 L. Ed. 495, 45 S. Ct. 207. The factual
set-up is not a usual one, but the case is analogous to those in which it is
sought by levy to attach the interest represented by stock certificates. At
common law, shares of stock in a corporation were not subject to levy and
sale on execution. Foster v. Potter (1866), 37 Mo. 525. The reason given
was that "to 'levy' means to seize. It follows that what cannot be taken
corporeally, cannot be levied on." Haley v. Reid (1854), 16 Ga. 437. The
interest of the shareholder was said to be an invisible and intangible thing.
At present, however, statutes generally permit levy upon an attachment of
stock. Cook, CORPORATIONS (8th Ed.), Sec. 482. Since a thing can be
seized only where it is, the cases turn on the situs of the shares in the cor-
poration. It is generally held that the situs of a share, "considered as prop-
erty separated from its owner" is at the domicil of the corporation. Cook,
CORPORATIONS (8th Ed.), Sec. 485. Armour Bros. Banking Co. v. St. Louis
Nat. Bank (1892), 113 Mo. 12, 20 S. W. 690. Hence, courts permit levy to
be made by process served on the corporation at its domicil. Barber 'V.
Morgan (1911), 84 Conn. 618, 80 A. 791, Ann. Cas. 1912D 951. It is often
held that shares can be attached only in the state creating the corporation.
See Smith v. Downey (1893), 8 Ind. App. 179, 34 N. E. 823, 52 Am. St. Rep.
467; Christmas v. Biddle (1850), 13 Pa. St. 223; Armour Bros. Banking Co.
v. St. Louis Nat. Bank, supra. In these cases, the certificates of foreign
corporations were in the state and within the jurisdiction of the court. In
Christmas v. Biddle, supra, the court said that seizure of the certificates is
as ineffective in attaching the share as a levy upon title deeds in attach-
ment of land in another state. This view is based on the conception that
certificates are muniments of title and merely evidence of the ownership of
a share in the corporation. The modern business view, however, is that a
certificate of stock is property in itself, and is, practically speaking, the
stock itself. Cook, CORPORATIONS (8th Ed.), Sec. 485; Simpson v. Jersey
City Contracting Co. (1900), 165 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 896, 55 L. R. A. 796.
As a result the modern trend of the courts is to permit levy upon a share
of stock by attachment of the certificate, although the domicil of the cor-
poration is in another state. Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., supra.
Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., supra. In the
latter case, it was said that the question of title depended on the law
of the place where the paper is (at least in cases where the certificate is, by
the law of the domicil of the corporation, transferable in blank). The prin-
cipal case is in accord with this modern doctrine. J. N., '29.
CRI mINAL LAw-CONsTRUCTIVE PRESENCE OF PRINcIPAL-Where a burg-
lary is committed pursuant to a conspiracy, one of the conspirators, located
at a considerable distance from the place burglarized, is nevertheless guilty
as a principal, if his location was for the purpose of accomplishing some-
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